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TORTS-Joint Tortfeasors-The Effect of a Release-Harris v. Grizzle, 599
P.2d 580 (1979).

On May 22, 1975, Diane Harris was injured in an automobile accident. Fifteen months later she died, and the
administrator of her estate instituted a wrongful death
action against the driver of the other vehicle involved in the
accident. That action was settled, a release was signed,
and the case was dismissed with prejudice. A second wrongful death action alleging negligence was filed against the
treating physician, surgeons and hospital. The District
Court of Laramie County granted the defendants motion
to dismiss and stated no reason. The Wyoming Supreme
Court reversed and held that the plaintiff-appellant had not
split his cause of action by suing the driver and appellees
separately and that the release did not discharge the appellees of their liability.'
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

The court disagreed with the appellees' assertion that
the appellant had split his cause of action by suing the driver involved in the accident in one wrongful death action,
then suing the physician, surgeons and hospital in a second
wrongful death action. The opinion was based primarily
upon the court's reading of the Wyoming Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.' The court recognized that
the general rule allowing joint tortfeasors to be sued separately or jointly was retained under Section 1-1-110 (h) of
the Wyoming Statutes, and in applying the rule to a wrongful death action, the court followed the reasoning of a 1972
California case, Helling v. Lew.3
There, the court found no requirement that the causes
of action and all potential defendants be joined in one action
for wrongful death. The California court was persuaded
that a wrongful death action sounds in tort and therefore,
the same principles applicable to the joinder of causes of
Copyright@

1980 by the University of Wyoming

1. Harris v. Grizzle, 599 P.2d 580 (1979).
2. Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-1-110 to 1-1-113 (1977).
3. Helling v. Lew, 28 Cal.App. 3d 434, 104 Cal.Reptr. 789 (1972).
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action and defendants in common law tort action should be
applied to statutory actions for wrongful death.4 In response to the argument that a wrongful death action is
joint, single, and indivisible, the California court stated
that the action is joint only insofar as it is subject to the
requirement that all heirs should join in the action and
that the damages awarded should be in a lump sum, that
it is single only insofar as it must be maintained by one of
the statutory designees, and that it is indivisible only insofar as it precludes omitted heirs from bringing subsequent
and individual actions for the recovery of their individual
damages.
To add support to its holding that the appellants could
bring two separate wrongful death actions, the Wyoming
court stated that the facts of the appellant's claim against
the driver were clearly different than those of the malpractice action. Since the cause or causes of death had
not been judicially determined, the court concluded that
there were two separate actions to be brought by the appellant.'
The court next addressed the question of the effect of
the release upon the subsequent wrongful death suit. The
appellees argued that the settlement and dismissal with
prejudice barred the second action.' The court found SecSince
tion 1-1-113 of the Wyoming Statutes applicable
the release9 did not purport to discharge the appellees, the
Id., 104 Cal.Rptr. at 792.
Id.
Harris v. Grizzle, supra note 1, at 585.
Brief for Appellees Flick and Sharp at 5, Brief for Appellee Hospital and
trustees at 5, Harris v. Grizzle, supra, note 1.
8. WYo. STAT. § 1-1-113 (1977).
(a) When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is
given in good faith to one (1) of two (2) or more persons liable in tort
for the same injury or the same wrongful death:
(i) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability
for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it
reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount
stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the
consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and
(ii) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability
for contribution to any other tortfeasor.
9. "The following named persons . . . do acknowledge full payment and
satisfaction of any claim or claims which they may have or may in the
future have against said defendants growing out of the motor vehicle
collision and accident described in paragraph 4 of said Complaint . .
Harris v. Grizzle, supra note 1, at 584.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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court held it could not release them from liability. The
rule in Feiser v. St. Francis Hospitaland School of Nursing,
Inc. was adopted, that a release of the original tortfeasor
does not automatically release the successive independant
tortfeasors. 0 The Wyoming court concluded that the release would have the effect of reducing a judgment against
the later tortfeasors, but would not bar a further recovery
from the doctor and hospital for malpractice unless it was
intended to release them or constituted full compensation
for the appellant's injury."
A close examination of the statute relied upon by the
court leads one to the conclusion that the Harris case was
correctly decided. Section 1-1-110 clearly applies to two
or more persons who become jointly or severally liable in
tort for the same wrongful death.12 Section 1-1-113 specifically states that a release of one or more persons liable in
tort for the same wrongful death will not discharge the
other joint tortfeasors from liability." Any holding that
the plaintiff could not bring an action against the other
joint tortfeasors after a release was signed with the first
joint tortfeasor would be a discharge of liability and clearly
would be prohibited under the statute.
The statute was applied simply and correctly; the result of the case, however, raises a number of problems.
First, it raises the practical problem of proving both the
negligence of the driver and the negligence of the physician
to be a cause of the death. Theories of proximate cause and
intervening cause might confuse the issue because the allegedly negligent acts of the defendants were independant
of one another. Separate duties were breached, and the
acts occurred at different times. Second, the ruling promotes the possibility of collusion between the plaintiff and
one defendant. Because the release discharges the first joint
tortfeasor from all liability for contribution to any other
joint tortfeasor,'4 a plaintiff may protect one joint tortfeasor
10. Feiser v. St. Francis Hospital and School of Nursing, Inc., 212 Kan. 35,
510 P.2d 145, 150(1973).
11. Harris v. Grizzle, 8upra note 1, at 586.
12. WYo. STAT. § 1-1-110 (1977).
13. WYo. STAT. § 1-1-113 (1977).
14. Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-113(a) (ii) (1977).
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from liability for his complete share of the damage and
obtain the remainder of the damages from another joint
tortfeasor.' 5 Third, the result of this case seems to have a
serious impact upon judicial economy. A plaintiff has
several causes of action, one against each joint tortfeasor.
He may choose to bring a suit against each person, and as
long as he settles each case before a decision is rendered, and
has not been fully compensated for his damage, he can continue to bring suits against the remaining joint tortfeasors.
A closer examination of the history and reasons for the results of this case is necessary to determine whether the
result is, in fact, justified.
JOINT OR INDEPENDENT TORTFEASORS

It is important to distinguish between joint tortfeasors
and subsequent independent tortfeasors. Each involves a
separate line of history.
Under the common law of England, liability for a "joint
tort" meant vicarious liability for concerted action. When
several persons acted in concert with a common purpose to
commit a trespass, the common law found the act of one
to be the act of all. Each person was liable for the entire
damage.'" Each person could be sued separately, but could
also be joined in one suit because the common law recognized
only one cause of action. In the United States, the rules of
joinder were more liberal, and courts would permit joinder
in situations in which the acts of two defendants combined to
produce a single and indivisible result. 7 By careless usage,
those defendants were labelled "joint tortfeasors.' 11 The
common law rule of one cause of action applying to joint
tortfeasors was retained, but without the underlying justification of concerted action." Each joint tortfeasor remained
severally liable for the entire wrong.
15.

Suppose the plaintiff has suffered $100,000 damages and
could be held 50% liable in a suit for contribution by X
tortfeasor. The plaintiff can release his brother for a
* $5,000 and seek and recover the rest from X in a court
be held liable for $95,000 but could not seek contribution
tiff's brother for $45,000.
16. PROSSER, TORTS § 46 (4th ed. 1971).
17. Id. § 47.
18. Id. § 49.
19. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss1/12

that his brother
who was a joint
consideration of
action. X would
from the plain-

4

Kepler: Torts - Joint Torfeasors - The Effect of a Release - Harris v. Gr

1980

CASE NOTES

341

A distinct line of history underlies the law of subsequent
independent tortfeasors. Under rules of proximate cause,
an original tortfeasor is liable for the consequences of his
negligence, including the subsequent negligence of a treating physician, provided the physician was chosen with reasonable care." A subsequent independent tortfeasor is liable
only for the part of the injury which he caused. 1
In the Harris case, death was the single, indivisible injury, and the court properly applied the statutes concerning
joint tortfeasors to the defendants. The court's reliance
on Feiser is misleading because that case is a part of the
law concerning subsequent independent tortfeasors. Feiser
involved a release which was signed when the plaintiff was
not aware of an injury which would later require hospitalization and surgery." The negligent actions of the doctor and
hospital occurred after the signing of the release and produced a separate injury. The doctor and the hospital were
subsequent independent tortfeasors and were liable for their
negligent action which further complicated the plaintiff's
injury.
In order for two persons to become joint tortfeasors, each
of their negligent acts must be shown to be a direct cause
of the single injury. Once this is established, notions of proximate or remote cause and supervening cause are no longer
applicable. 3 The Wyoming court did not address the issue
of causation, probably because the plaintiff must show causation at the trial level first.
THE RELEASE

One cause of action against joint tortfeasors meant that
a plaintiff could recover only one judgment under common
law, and even though that judgment might be unsatisfied,
Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 351 So.2d 703, 707 (Fla. 1977).
Gonzales v. Peterson 57 Wash. 2d 676 , 359 P.2d 307, 311 (1061). (damages
attributable to physician were pain and suffering that would have otherwise been avoided), Pederson v. Eppard, 181 Minn. 47, 231 N.W. 393, 394
(1930) (physician was liable only for the damages which his negligence
caused), PROSSER, TORTS § 52 at 321, 321.
22. Feiser v. St. Francis Hospital and School of Nursing, Inc., supra note 10,
at 147.
23. Sheehan v. New York 40 N.Y. 2d 496, 387 N.Y.S. 2d 92, 354 N.E. 2d 832,
835-836 (1976).

20.
21.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1980

5

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 15 [1980], Iss. 1, Art. 12

342

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XV

it barred any later action against another joint tortfeasor.24
A release, which is a surrender of a cause of action, necessarily released the other joint tortfeasors.25 Until recently,
that rule was applied to joint tortfeasors who were liable
for the same injury. 6
Today, courts and state legislatures have realized the
inconsistency and inequity of compelling the plaintiff to give
up the opportunity of settling with one joint tortfeasor because he would thereby lose his cause of action and be without complete compensation. Many states have enacted
statutes which prevent a release from discharging a second
tortfeasor unless the terms of the release so provide.2 7
A similar result has occurred with regard to the effect
of a release given to an original tortfeasor upon the liability
of subsequent independent tortfeasors. At first, since full
recovery could be obtained from the original wrongdoer
under the theory of proximate cause, a release given
to that wrongdoer also released the attending physician from
liability, even though the plaintiff had not been fully compensated for his harm.28 Exceptions to this rule were allowed when the physician's actions caused a new injury or
when the physician was guilty of gross negligence.2"
Today, a growing number of courts have held that a
release by an injured party of one responsible for the injury does not of itself, in the absence of such intent on the
part of the party, preclude an action against a physician for
subsequent negligent treatment unless there has been full
compensation in fact for the injuries."0 The rationale behind this charge is that there are two distinct causes of action
because the acts were different in nature and time and produced two separate injuries. 1 Unless the injured plaintiff
has been compensated for the entire wrong, he should be
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

PROssmR, TORTS § 48.
Id. § 49.
Id.
Id., WYo. STAT. § 1-1-113 (1977).
Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 260, 266 to 268 (1971).
Id. at 273 to 274.
Id. at 273 to 274.
Ash v. Mortensen, 24 Cal. 2d 654, 150 P.2d 876, 877 (1944).
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able to seek action against subsequent tortfeasors for compensation of the injury they caused.
The two lines of history have reached the same conclusion. A release will not work to discharge a joint tortfeasor
nor a subsequent independent tortfeasor. But the extent of
liability has not changed. A joint tortfeasor is still liable
for the entire harm, 2 while a subsequent independent tortfeasor is only liable for his contribution to the harm.3
CONTRIBUTION

AMONG MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS

History justifies the rule that a release will not discharge a joint tortfeasor's liability. But in all fairness, it
would also seem appropriate that the joint tortfeasors share
the burden of compensation for the plaintiff's injury. The
Wyoming legislature has provided for such a result by adopting Section 1-1-110 which gives joint tortfeasors a right
against one another for contribution according to their degree of fault."4
The next question must be why a release discharges a
joint tortfeasor from liability for contribution. It would
seem more in keeping with an equitable division of responsibility to hold that the release of one joint tortfeasor would
release his share of the plaintiff's injuries and to hold the
second joint tortfeasor liable only for his proportion of the
claim.
The original contribution provisions in the Wyoming
Statutes seemed to accomplish this. Section 1-7.5 reduced
the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the
consideration paid for the release. 5 Section 1-7.6 stated
that a release relieved the settling joint tortfeasor from lia32. WYO. STAT. § 1-1-111 (a) (i) (1977).
33. PROSSER, supra note 16, at § 52.
34. WYO. STAT. §§ 1-1-110, 1-1-111 (1977), Note that liability is determined
according to fault or culpability rather than physical causation. This is
of particular importance when the injury sustained is defined by a wrongful death statute and cannot be divided on a causal basis. In Wyoming,
damages recoverable for wrongful death are losses resulting to the beneficiary named in the statute. Such losses are loss of support and loss of
companionship. Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 3 P.2d 105, 43 Wyo. 298
(1931). The pain and suffering of the decedant has no part in establishing
damages. Parsons v. Roussalis, 488 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Wyo. 1971).
35. 1973 Wyo. SEss. LAwS Ch. 67 § 1-7.5.
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bility to make contribution to another joint tortfeasor only
if the release provided for "a reduction to the extent of the
pro rata share of the released tortfeasors of the injured
person's damages recoverable against all the other tortfeasors."3 Thus, either the injured person could not recover
part of the pro rata share of the settling joint tortfeasor
from the other joint tortfeasors, or a joint tortfeasor held
liable for more than his pro rata share of the injury could
recover the excess from the settling joint tortfeasor in an
action for contribution.
The Wyoming Statutes were changed to their present
form in 1977, and are essentially similar to the 1955 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act." A release now
relieves a settling joint tortfeasor from all liability for contribution, and there is no requirement for a pro rata reduction of the plaintiff's recoverable injures. The comments
to the revised 1955 Uniform Act give an explanation which
is useful in determining the purpose of the change. 8
The commissioners found the effect of the 1939 Uniform
Act had been to discourage settlements because it made it
impossible for one tortfeasor alone to take the release and
close the file. He would be subject to contribution claims
if the release did not have the appropriate pro rata reduction
clause, and plaintiffs would not accept a release which contained the clause because they had no way of knowing what
they were giving up. Since the commissioners found it more
important to encourage settlements than to prevent collusion, they changed the Act to release the settling tortfeasor
from all claims of contribution, and to reduce the plaintiff's
claim against non-settling joint tortfeasors only in the
amount of consideration paid or in the amount stipulated
by the release. 9
The release of the settling joint tortfeasor from liability for contribution would indeed encourage settlements.
But to allow an injured plaintiff to reduce his claim only to
36.
37.
38.
39.

1973 Wyo. SESS. LAWS Ch. 67 § 1-7.6.
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (1955 Revised Act).
Id. § 4(b) comment.
Id. See also Note, Wyoming Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 9 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 589, 623 (1974).
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the amount of the consideration for the release goes against
the whole underlying policy of the Act, i.e., to distribute the
burden among the joint tortfeasors equitably. It certainly
encourages the plaintiff to settle, but it also relieves him of
the responsibility of seeking an adequate settlement because
any inadequacy will be paid for by a non-settling joint tortfeasor.
A middle ground, relieving the settling tortfeasor from
contribution and reducing the plaintiff's claim by the tortfeasor's pro rata share, would encourage settlement and also
discourage collusion between the plaintiff and settling tortfeasors.4 ° Such a requirement would place the burden of an
equitable settlement upon the plaintiff and participating
joint tortfeasors rather than on the joint tortfeasor who was
not a party to the settlement agreement. This requirement
would also discourage multiple suits because the advantages
to the plaintiff of bringing multiple suits would be reduced.
IN PRACTICE

It is up to the legislature to make the final judgment
as to the equity of the Statutes. 1 Meanwhile, the attorney
must steer his client around the various pitfalls involved.
A non-settling joint tortfeasor has three possible directions of attack. He may claim that the release was not
given in good faith as required by the Statute and therefore
discharges other tortfeasors from liability.2 He may claim
that the plaintiff has received full compensation for his
damages, which releases the other joint tortfeasors from lia40. MacPherson, Contribution Among Tortfeasors, 25 AM. U. L. REv. 203, 236
(1975).
41. The California court made an "end run" around contribution legislation
by adoption of comparative partial indemnity as a modification of the
common law equitable indemnity doctrine. But the court recognized the
legislature's intent to encourage settlements, and even under the common
law doctrine, the court found that the plaintiff's recovery should be
diminished only in the amount that the plaintiff actually recovered in a
good faith settlement. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 146
Cal.Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899 (1978). But Cf. Fleming, Report to the Joint
Committee of the California Legislature on Tort Liability on the Problems
Associated with American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 30
HASTINGS L. J. 1463, 1498 (1979): "Recommendation 7: [B]ut the plaintiff's claim against the remaining tortfeasors shall be reduced by the amount
of the released tortfeasor's share of the loss."
42. WYO. STAT. § 1-1-113(a) (1977). Good faith is a vague term, however, and
proof of bad faith may be difficult.
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bility" Finally, he may claim that the release was intended
to discharge successive tortfeasors.44
The practical aspects of this last defense may work in
favor of a non-settling joint tortfeasor and against an unwary plaintiff. The Statute states that a release will not
discharge other tortfeasors unless "its terms so provide."
This indicates a presumption that no release of other joint
tortfeasors was intended unless the release so states. Yet a
standard general release often contains language which
purports to release all claims for a specific harm and can
work to release non-settling joint tortfeasors"
After Harris v. Grizzle, whether the release acts to
discharge joint tortfeasors not parties to the release is a
matter of intent." The question is now whether the meaning
of the word "terms" in the statute is limited to the written
words of the contract or whether it also includes the use of
parol evidence to determine intent. In Natrona Power Co.
v. Clark, the Wyoming court held that the intention of the
parties to a release, in the absence of fraud or mistake,
must be gathered from the writing. 8 The court also said
that the statement that the parole evidence rule has application only in suits between parties to the writing could not
be defended on principle.49 Thus, unambiguous language in
a general release that discharges all claims for an injury
will probably release other joint tortfeasors regardless of
whether that was the true intent of the injured person.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts rejects this conclusion
and states that "The agreement as to the effect of the release may be proved by external evidence; and the objection
of the parol evidence rule is met by the fact that the second
tortfeasor who raises the question is not a party to the
instrument.""
43. Harris v. Grizzle, supra note 1, at 586.
44. Id., Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-113(i) (1977).
45. WYO. STAT. § 1-1-113(i) (1977).
46. Hasselrode v. Gnagey, 404 Pa. 549, 172 A.2d 764, 765 (1961), (decided
under Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act).
47. Harris v. Grizzle, supra note 1, at 586.
48. Natrona Power Co. v. Clark, 31 Wyo. 284, 225 P. 586 (1924).
49. Id. 225 P. at 589.
OF TORTS § 885. comment d. There is a split of
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
authority in this regard. See Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 313 (1967), citing
Natrona Power Co. v. Clark, supra note 48, at 13 A.L.R.3d 336.
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CONCLUSION

Under the Wyoming Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act,"1 the court in Harris v. Grizzle decided that a
release given to one joint tortfeasor would not discharge
another joint tortfeasor liable for the same wrongful death
unless that was the intent of the parties to the release or
unless consideration for the release constituted full compensation of the plaintiff's injuries. The Act, however,
works an injustice upon the non-settling joint tortfeasor
who becomes liable for the remaining damages without
recourse to contribution from the settling joint tortfeasor.
To prevent this injustice and to discourage collusion between the plaintiff and settling joint tortfeasors, the statute
should be changed to permit the plaintiff to seek recovery
from non-settling joint tortfeasors for only those joint tortfeasors' pro rata share of the injury.
LORETTA

51.

B. KEPLER

Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-1-110 to 1-1-113 (1977).
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